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THE MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT: THREAT TO FOSTER
CHILD SAFETY AND WELL-BEING?
DavidJ. Herring*
Despite the efforts ofpublic officials to reduce the time children spend in foster care,
many children live in foster homes for a substantialportion of their childhoods. In
fact, a child placed in a foster home may remain in that home for an extended period, with a significant possibility of remaining there permanently. In light of this
situation, the decision to place a child in a particularfoster home is extremely important.
The federal Multiethnic Placement Act ("MEPA ") significantly affects foster care
placement decisions. This law expressly prohibitspublic child welfare agenciesfrom
delaying or denying a child'sfostercare or adoptive placement on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. Federalofficials have interpreted MEPA as barringpublic agencies from routinely and systematically considering race when placing
children in particularfoster homes. In other words, MEPA precludes these agencies
from pursuing children's interests through a policy or practice of matching a
child's race with that of his or herfoster parent.
T date, commentators who have examined MEPA have focused their attentionon
identifying and weighing the benefits and harms of transracialadoption for minority children and communities. As a consequence, they have not addressed the
impact of MEPA on foster careplacement decisions in any detail.
In contrast, this Article examines foster care placement decisions. More specifically,
this Article uses behavioral biology research on kinship cues and social psychology
research on in-groupfavoritism to formulate a hypothesis that has implicationsfor
MEPA's prohibition on the routine consideration of race in making foster care
placement decisions. Namely, children placed with non-kin, same-race foster parents are likely to be safer and healthier than children placed with non-kin,
different-racefoster parents. The Article calls for a test of this hypothesis, explains
how such a test may proceed, and discusses possible implications for laws and
policies that address race andfoster care.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the efforts of public officials to reduce the time children
spend in foster care, many children live in foster homes for a
*
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substantial portion of their childhoods.' In order to improve conditions for these children, it is necessary to understand the
dynamics of the foster parent/foster child relationship. Findings
from behavioral biology and social psychology research are helpful
in addressing this need.2 This Article uses this research to formulate a hypothesis that has implications for the current prohibition
on the routine
. • 3consideration of race in making foster care placement decisions. Namely, children placed with non-kin, same-race
foster parents are likely to be safer and healthier than children
placed with non-kin, different-race foster parents.
Since the 1970's, federal law has been the dominant mechanism
for reform of state public child welfare systems.4 Although many
assert that family matters are primarily subject to state control,
Congress has largely taken over state child welfare systems through
the exercise of its spending power. For example, if states want to
receive federal funds for foster care expenditures, they must comply with a set of federal statutes and regulations that dictate the
design of their child welfare systems.' Because every state depends
heavily on federal funds to sustain their public child welfare sys1.
See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT-PRELIMINARY FY 2005 ESTIMATES AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/

afcars/tar/report 13.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2007) [hereinafter the AFCARS Report] (revealing that 37% of the 513,000 children in foster care had spent more than two years in
foster care placements, with 15% having spent five years or more). See generally Susan P.
Kemp & Jami M. Bodonyi, Beyond Termination: Length of Stay and Predictors of Permanencyfor
Legally Free Children, 81 CHILD WELFARE 58 (2002); Brenda D. Smith, After ParentalRights are
Terminated: Factors Associated with Exiting FosterCare, 25 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 965
(2003); Fred Wulczyn, Closing the Gap: Are Changing Exit Patterns Reducing the Time African
American Children Spend in Foster Care Relative to Caucasian Children, 25 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 431 (2003).
2.
See generally David J. Herring, Child Placement Decisions: The Relevance of Facial Resemblance and Biological Relationships, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 387 (2003) [hereinafter Facial
Resemblance]; David J. Herring, Foster Care Placement: Reducing the Risk of Sibling Incest, 37 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 1145 (2004) [hereinafter Reducing the Risk]; David J. Herring, FosterCare
Safety and the Kinship Cue of Attitude Similarity, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 355 (2006) [hereinafter Attitude Similarity]; Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117 (1997).
3.
See The Multiethnic Placement Act ("MEPA"), Pub. L. 103-382, § 551, 108 Stat.
4056 (1994) [hereinafter MEPA] (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2000) and 42
U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996)).
4.
See id.; The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-79(b) (2007)); The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 67179(b) (2007)).
5.
See, e.g., The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96272, 94 Stat. 500 at §§ 671-79(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 671-79(b) (2007));
Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failureof the Adoption and Safe
FamiliesAct of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637 (1999).
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tems, state laws, policies, and practices comply with federal law, at
least in form if not in operation."
The construction of federal child welfare law proceeds primarily
from permanency planning concepts. These concepts have their
origin in child development theory and social work policy and
practice! Their goal is to secure child well-being by having at least
one adult make a permanent commitment to care for and raise
each child."
Permanency planning concepts have significant implications for
state actors in public child welfare systems. According to permanency planning, state actors should be reluctant to disrupt an
established parent/child relationship. Intervention in family associations, especially interventions that entail removal of children
from parental custody, should occur only when necessary to protect children from serious harm.' In addition, if state actors must
intervene, the period of intervention should be as short as possible." For instance, if they must place a child in foster care, state
actors should return the child to parental custody as soon as a parent can provide minimally adequate care. Because this is a strongly
favored outcome, state actors should actively provide services to
the parent and child so that reunification can occur as soon as possible.'2 However, if state actors determine that a child's parents will
be unable to provide minimally adequate care in time to meet the
child's developmental needs, they should secure an alternative
permanent placement as soon as possible. This could mean an
adoption placement, permanent guardianship, or another arrangement that results in an adult making a permanent
commitment to care for the child. 3
Current federal law, and the state laws that parrot it, appears
well designed to achieve timely permanent placements for children
while also securing child safety and health. Federal law requires
states to maintain systems that encourage and facilitate the reporting of child maltreatment."4 Once state actors receive a report, they
must investigate and take appropriate action such as providing the
6.
See Gordon, supra note 5, at 642-46; 673-84; DavidJ. Herring, The Adoption and Safe
Families Act-Hope and Its Subversion, 34 FAMILY L.Q. 329, 331-36 (2000).
See Herring, supra note 6, at 329-31; ANTHONY M. MALUCCIO ET AL., PERMANENCY
7.
PLANNING FOR CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND METHODS 5 (1986).
MALUCCIO ET AL., supra note 7, at 3-16.
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.
11.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
42 U.S.C. § 5106f-1 (2003).

92

University ofMichiganJournalof Law Reform

[VOL. 41:1

subject family with support services or removing a child from parental custody.' If they remove a child, state actors must make
efforts to return the child to the parents as soon as possible unless
the particular family's circumstances are egregious, 16 While making
reunification efforts, state actors' paramount concern must be the
child's safety and health. 7
In addition, an administrative or judicial officer must review the
affected family's situation at least every six months while the child
remains out of parental custody.' This officer must determine if
the state child welfare agency is making reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent and formulating appropriate plans for
the child's future. 19 The state must provide a permanency hearing
at the time a child has been out of parental custody for twelve
months.20 The presiding officer must ensure that the state agency
has an appropriate plan to achieve a timely permanent placement
for the child.2 Once a child has been in foster care for fifteen of
the past twenty-two months, the state agency must petition a court
to terminate -parental rights unless the child is living with kin, termination would clearly not serve the child's best interests, or the
state has failed to make adequate reunification efforts.2 2 If the
court grants the petition, state actors must make efforts to secure a
permanent placement for the child, with adoption being the favored outcome.3
Through this process of case review, the law seeks to secure an
affected child's safety and health while also achieving a timely
permanent placement for him or her. If effectively implemented,
this legal scheme should reduce the number of cases where state
actors remove a child from parental custody. Removal would occur
only after state actors have provided an affected family with appropriate public services and only when necessary to protect a child
from a significant risk of serious harm. In addition, children whom
the state must remove from parental custody should exit their

15.
See 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) (B) (2007) (calling for states to require public child welfare agencies to make reasonable efforts to maintain or reunify a child's family of origin).
16.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a) (15) (D) (2007).
17.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (A) (2007).
18.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 (a)(16), 675(5) (B) (2007).
19.
See42 U.S.C. §§ 671 (a)(16), 675(1)(B), 675(5) (B) (2007).
20.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671 (a) (16), 675(5)(c) (2007).
21.
Id.
22.
42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (E)(2007).
23.
Id.
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temporary foster care placements within six to twenty-four
months.
In light of these expectations, one could reasonably predict a
significant reduction in the number of children residing in foster
care. Statistics concerning the nation's foster care population constitute one measure of the effectiveness of the federal legal
scheme .25

Unfortunately, foster care statistics reveal the failure of federal
child welfare law. The number of children living in foster care has
grown steadily during recent years. Well over half a million children now live in temporary placements, 27 with many spending
more than two years in foster care. 281
Even the extreme measure of terminating parental rights has
not addressed this latter problem. Many children are now legal orphans, having been freed for adoption without the prospect of
joining new families anytime soon, if ever.29 Making matters worse
is the demographic profile .of children who live in foster care. They
are disproportionally from poor, minority families. 30 Living in poverty within a minority community appears to significantly increase
the risk of a child spending a substantial portion of childhood in
foster care."
Governmental actors have failed to adequately support and effectively implement a well-designed child welfare legal scheme. 2
The current reality is that a substantial number of children (especially minority children) spend a significant amount of time in
temporary foster care placements. Accordingly, focusing exclusively on family preservation and permanency planning, while
ignoring conditions in foster care, overlooks viable opportunities
to improve children's lives. To seize these opportunities, public
24.
See generally Gordon, supra note 5 (noting an emphasis on achieving timely permanent placements for children in foster care as evidenced by federal law that requires a
permanency hearing within twelve months of a child's placement in foster care and mandates the filing of a petition seeking termination of parental rights when a child has been
placed in foster care for fifteen of the past twenty-two months); Kemp & Bodonyi, supra note
1; Smith, supra note 1.
25.
See Kemp & Bodonyi, supra note 1, at 61.
26.
Id.
27.
The AFCARS Report, supra note 1, at 1-2.
28.
Id.
29.
See Kemp & Bodonyi, supra note 1, at 63-65; Smith, supra note 1, at 968-69, 97980.
30.
See Wulczyn, supra note 1, at 431, 433. See generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATrERED
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE

(2002).

31.
ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 7-10, 94-95.
32.
See Gordon, supra note 5, at 643-50, 662-67, 673-84; Herring, supra note 6, at 33336, 341-48.
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officials must realize that one aspect of the child welfare system
calls out for their attention-foster care. 33
Because many children will spend a great deal of time growing
up in foster care, the decision to place a child in a particular foster
home is extremely important. 4 In fact, a child placed in a foster
33.
Many aspects of the current conditions of children in foster care are problematic.
After experiencing the trauma of maltreatment and removal from parental custody, these
children experience a high level of instability. For example, a recent study found that a cohort of children in foster care from 1990 to 1992 in San Diego experienced an average of
more than four different placements during an eighteen month period, with the number of
placements ranging from one to fifteen. Sigrid James et al., Placement Movement in Out-ofHome Care: Patterns and Predictors, 26 CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 185, 190 (2004). An-

other recent study of a cohort of children who had been placed in foster care between 1988
and 1998 in Washington and Oregon found that these children experienced an average of
over six moves during their time in foster care. See PETERJ. PECORA ET AL., IMPROVING FAMILY FOSTER CARE: FINDINGS FROM THE NORTHWEST FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDY 26 (2005),

http://Aw%.casey.org/NR/rdonlyres/4EE7C77-7624-4260-A25389C5A6CB9El/923/CaseyAlumniStudyupdated082006.pdf. Over sixty-five percent of these
children spent more than 3.5 years in care. Id. at 27. (This is largely consistent with national
data indicating the average stay in foster care is more than 28 months. The AFCARS Report,
supra note 1.) Almost one-third of the children experienced ten or more school changes
from elementary through high school, with sixty-five percent experiencing seven or more
school changes. PECORA ET AL., supra, at 28. The former foster children reported that a
significant number of their foster parents had been disengaged or authoritarian, expressing
little warmth. Id. at 30. Over thirty-two percent of the former foster children experienced
some form of maltreatment while in care (i.e. sexual abuse, physical abuse, or physical neglect). Id. This finding is consistent with other studies that have found a high level of
maltreatment in foster care. SeeJill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance with the
Law: The failure to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 7 (1999);

Mary I. Benedict et al., Types and Frequency of Child Maltreatment by Family Foster Care Providers
in an Urban Population, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 577 (1994). The sttdy did find that
the former foster children had had access to a high level of education and therapeutic services, but that many of these individuals experienced negative outcomes in terms of mental
health, employment, and finances. Pecora et al., supra, at 28, 32-39. In light of these findings, there are opportunities to improve conditions in foster care.
34.
This is especially true in light of public agency efforts to achieve stable foster care
placements. See PECORA ET AL., supra note 33, at 25 (noting the importance of and recommending placement stability). Because of these efforts, foster children are likely to spend a
significant period in a chosen foster home thus increasing the stakes of a foster care placement decision for the placed child. Despite the importance of a foster care placement
decision, a team of researchers that investigated agency practices in placing children in
specific foster homes characterized the process as exhibiting institutional neglect. See Emily
Jean McFadden & Patricia Ryan, Allegations of Maltreatment in Family Foster Homes, in ASSESSINC CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTS 209, 213 (Michael Robin ed., 1991); James A.
Rosenthal et al., A Descriptive Study of Abuse and Neglect in Out-of-Home Placement, 15 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 249, 250-51 (1991). Another group of researchers discussed the realities
of the foster care system in an attempt to explain their findings that a significant portion of
reports of abuse and neglect in foster care involves serious incidents:
Dynamics in family foster care demonstrate the interaction of multiple causal factors.
Low pay leads to shortages in foster homes. These shortages create pressure to license
marginal homes. Pressures to place children in the least restrictive setting direct difficult, behaviorally disturbed children into family foster care. Large caseloads mitigate
against adequate supportive services by foster care workers. Inevitably, an over-
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with a significant
home may reside there for an extended period,
5
possibility of remaining there permanently)
The federal Multiethnic Placement Act ("MEPA") significantly
affects foster care placement decisions. This law prohibits public
child welfare agencies from delaying or denying a child's foster
race, color, or national
care •or
• 37 adoptive placement on the basis of
origin. Public agencies cannot routinely and systematically consider race in placing a child in a particular foster home. Only in
exceptional circumstances related to an individual child's demonstrated, specific need for a foster parent of a particular race does
MEPA allow an agency to consider race.38
A primary purpose of MEPA is to eliminate discrimination that
lengthens the time that minority children wait for adoption placements.

'0

Under

the law, agencies

cannot delay an

adoption

placement in order to match the race of the child with that of the
adoptive parent. Because of the shortage of minority adoptive parents, 40 many expect MEPA to increase the number of transracial
strained family helps out in a crisis. [For example,] [p]erhaps two abused children
need emergency short-term placement. As no other placements are available, the
short-term placements [sic] extends on. These events combine with stress in the family home-perhaps the husband is laid off at work-to create a tension-filled setting.
A foster child reacts to this tension with provoking behavior and is abused. The children are removed, placed in another home, and a similar cycle repeats. The county
investigation assigns blame to the foster family.
Rosenthal et al., supra, at 257-58. This description identifies the frequent failure of agencies to carefully match children with foster parents and homes. In current practice, the
availability of a bed for the child often appears to be the driving force in making placement
decisions. The placement process is often haphazard, leaving a great deal of room for improvement. See id. For a more extensive discussion of this process, see Herring, Facial
Resemblance, supra note 2, at 401-05.
35.
It is important to note that a significant portion of these children effectively, if not
formally, will be permanently placed with their foster parents. For example, the adoption of
foster children by their foster parents is supported by public agencies and has grown dramatically. See The AFCARS Report, supra note 1, at 12 (reporting that 60% of the children
adopted from the public foster care system during fiscal year 2005 were adopted by their
foster parents).
36.
MEPA, Pub. L. 103-382, § 551, 108 Stat. 4056 (1994) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1996b (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996)).
37.
Id.
38.
SeeADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
A

GUIDE TO THE MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT OF

1994 As

AMENDED

BY THE INTERETHNIC

1996 ch. 1, pt. A (1998) [hereinafter "HHS Guide"],
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/mepa94/mepachp1.htm.
39.
See Devon Brooks et al., Adoption and Race: Implementing the Multiethnic Placement Act
and the InterethnicAdoption Provisions,44 Soc. WORK 167 (1999); HHS Guide, supra note 38.
40.
See Richard P. Barth, Effects of Age and Race on the Odds of Adoption versus Remaining
in Long-Term Out-of-Home Care, 76 CHILD WELFARE 285, 302 (1997) (describing the inadequacy of federally funded minority adoptive parent recruitment projects to address "the
gross discrepancy between the numbers of African American children in care and African

ADOPTION

PROVISIONS

OF
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adoptions. 4' To date, commentators have focused their attention
on identifying and weighing the benefits and harms of transracial
adoption on minority children and communities. 42 As a consequence, they have not addressed the impact of MEPA on foster
care placement decisions in any detail.
Findings from behavioral biology and social psychology research
that investigates kinship cues and in-group favoritism provide reasons to suspect that a prohibition on the consideration of race
jeopardizes child safety and well-being in foster care.43 This Article
will examine this research and explore its implications for MEPA's
prohibition on the consideration of race in foster care placement
decisions. Part I discusses MEPA's development, current provisions,
and implementation. Part II describes the debate surrounding
MEPA. Part III presents a hypothesis concerning MEPA's possible
impact on child safety and well-being in foster care. Part III also
calls for a test of the hypothesis, explains how such a test may proceed, and discusses possible implications for laws and policies that
address race and foster care.
I.

THE MULTIETHNIC PLACEMENT ACT

Congress enacted MEPA in 1994 in response to the widespread
practice of placing children primarily with foster or adoptive parents of the same race and a separate set of practices that
discouraged minority individuals from serving as foster or adoptive
parents. 44 These latter practices contributed to a shortage of minority foster and adoptive parents. 45 As a result, it was very difficult for

many public agencies to place children with same-race foster or
adoptive parents. Minority children frequently had to live in a
American families who could adopt"); Devon Brooks et al., Preferred Characteristicsof Children
in Need of Adoption: Is There a Demandfor Available Foster Children?,76 Soc. SERVICE REV. 575,
577 (2002).
41.
See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRWr, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 182 (1999); Brooks et al., supra note 40, at 577;
Sarah Ramsey, FixingFoster Care or Reducing Child Poverty: The Pew Commission Recommendations
and the TransracialAdoptionDebate, 66 MONTANA L. REv. 21, 41 (2005).
42.
See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 41; RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES:
SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION chs. 11-12 (2003); Carla Bradley & Cynthia G.
Hawkins-Le6n, The TransracialAdoption Debate: Counselingand Legal Implications, 80 J. COUNS.
& DEV.433 (2002); Devon Brooks & Richard P. Barth, Adult Transracialand InracialAdoptees:
Effects of Race, Gender, Adoptive Family Structure, and Placement History on Adjustment Outcomes,
69 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 87 (1999); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, TransracialAdoption (TRA):
Old Prejudicesand DiscriminationFloat Under a New Halo, 6 B. U. PUB. INT. L.J. 409 (1997).
43.
See infra notes 94-207 and accompanying text.
44.
SeeBrooks etal., supra note 40; HHS Guide, supra note 38, atch. 1, pts. A-B.
45.
See Brooks et al., supra note 40, at 577; HHS Guide, supranote 38, ch. 1,pt. C.
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temporary placement while the agency sought a same-race home.
This wait could be lengthy, allowing a child to form a strong bond
with a temporary caretaker such as a different-race foster parent.
When this occurred, the agency would eventually have to disrupt
an established family bond when it secured a same-race placement.4 In many other cases, agencies failed to secure a same-race
adoptive family,
effectively denying affected children a permanent
7
placement.
Some members of Congress believed this situation of delay and
failure surrounding the placement of minority children in foster
and adoptive homes harmed affected children. 48 Lawmakers perceived public agencies as failing to promote the best interests of
minority children by effectively denying them timely placements in
permanent homes. They.passed MEPA in order to prohibit agencies from using race, color, or national origin 49 to delay or deny a
child's placement in a particular foster or adoptive home.
Originally, the statute expressly permitted agencies to consider
race as one of a number of factors in assessing a child's best interests and the capacity of prospective foster or adoptive parents to
meet the child's needs 5'An agency could not delay or deny a
placement solely on the basis of race, but in making a placement
decision an agency could routinely consider race as one relevant
factor among many. In 1996, Congress amended this provision of
MEPA.5 The current version of MEPA prohibits agencies from routinely considering race as one of many factors relevant to a
placement decision. 3
The Administration of Children and Families of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services has issued a

46.
HHS Guide, supra note 38, ch. 1, pt. C.
47.
See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121, 132-34 (1995); HHS Guide, supra
note 38.
48.
HHS Guide, supra note 38.
49.
For purposes of this article, the word "race" stands for the broader statutory phrase
"race, color, or national origin."
50.
MEPA, Pub. L. 103-382, § 551, 108 Stat. 4056 (1994) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1996b (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994) (repealed 1996)); HHS Guide, supra
note 38. MEPA also requires agencies to make diligent efforts to recruit minority foster and
adoptive parents.
51.
HHS Guide, supra note 38, at ch. 3, § 2.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at ch. 3, § 3. The HHS Guide states that "on rare occasions, the distinctive
needs of an individual child may warrant consideration of the child's race, color, or national
origin." Id. The Guide makes it clear that the use of racial or ethnic factors is permitted only
in "exceptional circumstances where the special or distinctive needs of a child require it and
where those needs can be documented or substantiated." Id.
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guide to MEPA. 4 The guide aims to "assist states and child welfare
agencies in their efforts to comply with the new federal mandates
concerning the role of race, color, and national origin in foster
care and adoptive placements. 5 5 It begins by noting that prior to
the enactment of MEPA, agencies had generally favored placing
children with families of the same race, with transracial placements
a last resort. 56 The guide articulates its view of the reasoning once
openly used by agencies to justify the race matching approach:
children have special needs because of their immutable racial
57
characteristics, as well as because of their cultural experiences.
Thus, agencies should place children with adult caretakers who
can fully address these race-based needs.
Just as it was assumed that most prospective parents want children who resemble them, it was assumed that children would
be uncomfortable in an adoptive family that did not have a
similar racial or ethnic heritage. It was alleged that children
raised in racially or ethnically matched families would more
easily develop self esteem and a strong racial identity, and that
minority children would have the best opportunity to learn
the skills needed to cope with racism they were likely to encounter as they grew up in American society59
Apparently, child welfare agencies had assumed that their race
matching policies and practices complied with federal law. The
guide rejects this assumption, asserting that both the Constitution
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act bar states and publicly-funded
entities from systematically placing children in racially matched
foster care and adoptive homes. °
In the authors' view, MEPA simply makes it clear that such
placement practices are to be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard. 61 Therefore, a state must have a compelling interest that it is
pursuing through race matching.62 In addition, the policy and
54.
HHS Guide, supra note 38.
55.
Id. at ch. 1. State officials have a significant incentive to comply with MEPA because
the law provides for "the withholding of federal funds and the right of any aggrieved individual to seek relief in federal court against a state or other entity alleged to be in violation."
HHS Guide, supra note 38; see alsoMEPA, Pub. L. 103-382, § 551,108 Stat. 4056 (1994).
56.
HHS Guide, supra note 38, at ch. 1. pt. C.
57.
Id. at ch. 1, pt. C.
58.
See id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at ch. 1, pt. D.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.

FALL

2007]

The Multiethnic Placement Act

practice of race matching must be narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling interest. 6' Accordingly, a state agency cannot simply
assume that every child's best interests (arguably a compelling state
interest) call for a same-race placement.6 4 In other words, race
matching cannot be a routine practice. 6'
MEPA-IEP encourages child welfare workers to make decisions on the basis of individualized needs of each child, and
renders suspect any placement decision based on stereotypical thinking or untested generalizations about what children
need. From now on, it should be clear that any use of race,
color, or ethnicity is subject to the strict scrutiny standard of
review, and that the use of racial or ethnic factors is permitted, only in exceptional circumstances where the special or
distinctive needs of a child require it and where those needs
can be documented or substantiated.66
As to enforcement, federal officials note that MEPA authorizes
the United States Department of Health and Human Services to
impose Title [V-B fiscal penalties and Title IV-E graduated financial
penalties on offending states.67 In addition, it expressly authorizes
private individuals who are adversely affected by a violation of the
law to seek injunctive relief, monetary damages, and attorneys' fees
in federal court. 68 State officials are likely to view the financial implications of these enforcement mechanisms as significant
incentives to comply with MEPA.69
II. THE MEPA DEBATE
In the federal guide to MEPA, federal officials expressly acknowledge that their views are controversial and that they cannot
resolve the debate surrounding MEPA.7 ° In beginning their discussion of this debate, federal officials identify two primary concerns
63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.
Id. The guide acknowledges that some courts had struggled with this issue and had
evaluated some racial classifications with less than strict scrutiny if public agencies intended
to promote diversity or remedy the effect of historic discrimination. Id. However, in the
authors' view, the United States Supreme Court has applied the strict scrutiny standard to all
racial classifications, even those that are allegedly benign. Id.
66.
Id. at ch. 3.
67.
Id. at ch. 2; see MEPA, Pub. L. 103-382, § 551,108 Stat. 4056.
68.
HHS Guide, supra note 38, at ch. 2.
69.

See id.

70.

Id. at ch. 1.
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Congress addressed in passing MEPA. First, Congress was concerned about reports that child welfare agencies were removing
minority children from stable transracial foster homes in order to
place them with someone of the same race whom the children had
never met. 71 Second, Congress was concerned with reports of child

welfare agencies denying minority children timely adoptive placements because of their prolonged efforts to find race-matched
adoptive homes. v2
In light of these concerns, federal officials' discussion of the
controversy surrounding MEPA primarily focuses on achieving
timely permanent placements. In fact, their discussion focuses almost exclusively on one type of permanent placement-adoption.
Although the guide alludes to the insistence of proponents of race
matching policies that agencies recruit a diverse pool of both foster
and adoptive parents (an issue that federal officials believe MEPA
addresses) ,7 the remainder of the discussion emphasizes adoption
placements.

74

In presenting their view of the controversy, federal

officials assert the superiority of adoption by referring to studies
that indicate that adopted children perform better on most outcome measures than do children who remain in foster care.7
Federal officials then discuss the desirability of transracial adoption. Initially, they note that critics of racial matching assert that
little evidence supports the claim that transracial adoption is harmful to children's self-esteem, sense of racial identity, or ability to
cope with racism. 76 The officials themselves then assert that transracial adoptees do as well as same-race adoptees in these areas,
developing a positive sense of racial identity and doing even better
in school]' They conclude the discussion on a positive note concerning race relations:
[t]here are some differences that manifest themselves over
time between same-race and transracial adoptive families.
Among these is that transracial adoptees have a more positive
attitude about relations with whites, are more comfortable in
integrated and multiethnic settings, and do not consider race

71.
Id. at ch. 3, p. 1.
72.
Id. The guide notes that some agencies required specific waiting periods during
which they would search for a same race placement or required caseworkers to justify a
transracial placement.
73.
Id. at ch. 1.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
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as basic to their self-understanding as do most same-race
adoptees. 8
Federal officials perceive and embrace transracial adoption as an
effective mechanism for achieving a color-blind society.
Commentators who support the consideration of race in making
placement decisions disagree with federal officials' views and conclusions. 9 They also focus almost entirely on adoptive placements,
especially on the issues surrounding transracial adoptions.8 0 These
commentators raise methodological and analytical questions about
studies that indicate that transracial adoptees do not suffer developmental harm and turmoil, especially in relation to their racial
identity and sense of belonging."' They also raise the prospect of
harm to minority communities posed by transracial adoption. 2 According to these theorists, the majority, often using the power of
the state, devalues minority parents and communities, removing
their children and "saving" them through placement in a majority
family."3 In the past, the National Association of8 Black
Social Work4
ers has characterized this as "cultural genocide."
Because both sides in the debate focus on adoption policy, they
largely ignore foster care or simply demonize it in passing: 5foster
care placements do harm, result in worse outcomes for children,
and are to be limited in duration as much as possible.
However, as discussed previously, numerous children spend a
substantial portion of their childhood living in a foster home. For
all intents and purposes, the foster home is their childhood home,
and the foster family is their family. This is the reality of the public

78.
Id.
79.
See Bradley & Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 42; Margaret F. Brinig, The Child's Best Interests: A Neglected Perspective on InterracialIntimacies, 117 HARV. L. REV.2129 (2004); Brooks et
al., supra note 39; Howe, supra note 42; Ruth McRoy, Expedited Permanency, Implicationsfor
African-American Children and Families, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 475 (2005); Twila L. Perry,
Power Possibilityand Choice: The RacialIdentity of TransraciallyAdopted Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE

& L. 215 (2003).
80.
See, e.g., Brooks et al., supra note 39 (mentioning foster care, but primarily as a
complicating factor in achieving adoption); Howe, supra note 42; McRoy, supranote 79.
81.
See Bradley & Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 42, at 434-36; Sarah Ramsey, Fixing Foster
Care or Reducing Child Poverty: The PEW Commission Recommendations and the TransracialAdoption Debate, 66 MONT. L. REv. 21, 42 (2005).
82.
See ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 236-53; Howe, supra note 42, at 416-17.
83.
ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 236-53; Howe, supra note 42.
84.
ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 246-48.
85.
See, e.g.,
KENNEDY, supra note 42; Brinig, supra note 79; see also Ramsey, supra note
81, at 39-44.
86.
Ramsey, supra note 81, at 39-44.
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child welfare system, and it affects a disproportionate number of
minority children. 7
Several leading social work scholars have noted that the debate
surrounding MEPA has focused on transracial adoption despite the
fact that MEPA regulates foster care placement decisions as much
as adoption decisions.' These scholars view transracial adoption as
a mere distraction for child welfare officials who are attempting to
secure child safety, well-being, and permanency.8 9 Because not
nearly enough white adoptive parents are available, or willing, to
adopt the many minority children living in foster care, ° transracial
adoption is unlikely to be an effective mechanism for addressing
the needs of these children. 9' Further, all the energy and effort expended in pursuing or resisting transracial adoption only
diminishes the resources available to address the situation of these
children and their families. 2 For example, public officials could be
much more effective if they emphasized family support and preservation programs, family reunification efforts, kinship care
93
placements and support, and foster care conditions and support.
The prevalence of foster care in the current system suggests that
a close examination of conditions in foster care is in order. Such an
examination would properly include an inquiry into the impact of
MEPA on foster care placement decisions made shortly after a
child is removed from parental custody. In particular, how does the
prohibition on the consideration of race at this point in a case affect child safety and well-being? Does prohibiting the consideration
of race contribute to securing child safety and well-being or does it
increase the risk of harm faced by foster children? Acknowledging
such questions may provide a basis for formulating testable hypotheses that could eventually contribute to the improvement of
conditions in foster care. In the next Section, this Article uses scientific research to formulate one such hypothesis.

87.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
88.
See Brooks et al., supra note 40; Mark E. Coutrmey, The Politics and Realities of TransracialAdoption, 76 CHILD WELFARE 749, 750, 768-69 (1997).
89.
See Courtney, supranote 88, at 765-72.
90.
See Barth, supra note 40; Brooks et al., supra note 40; Courtney, supra note 88.
91.
Courtney, supra note 88, at 755-60.
92.
Id. at 766-71.
93.
Id. at 765-72.
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III. MEPA

103

AND FOSTER CARE PLACEMENT DECISIONS:

THE FORMULATION OF A HYPOTHESIS

Research in the fields of behavioral biology and social psychology provides a basis for a hypothesis concerning race and foster
care placements. 4 Namely, children are likely to experience less
maltreatment and receive more favorable treatment in non-kin,
same-race foster placements than in non-kin, different-race foster
placements. 115
Two primary lines of research support this hypothesis. The first
is behavioral biology research addressing kinship cues. 9" The second is social psychology research examining in-group favoritism! 7

A. BehavioralBiology Research-KinshipCues
The behavioral biology line of research arises from evolutionary
theory and the concept of inclusive fitness. "9 Individuals who are
biologically related share a significant amount of genetic material
that distinguishes them from other members of their species:""As a
result, an individual can increase the amount of his or her genetic
material that passes on to future generations not only through his
or her own reproductive success, but also through that of his or
her kin.'00 In other words, an individual who possesses a behavioral
trait or inclination to assist kin in achieving reproductive success
will be more likely to maximize the amount of his or her genetic
material present in future generations. Accordingly, there has been
and is significant natural selection pressure to possess the trait of
kinship altruism.'0 ' In the end, an individual is likely to favor members of his or her kin group, providing them with beneficial

94.
See, e.g., Herring, Attitude Similarity, supra note 2, at 388-90.
95.
Id.
96.
See, e.g.,
Irene Bevc & Irwin Silverman, Early Separationand SiblingIncest: A Test of the
Revised Westermarck Theory, 21 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 151 (2000);Justin H. Park & Mark
Schaller, Does Attitude Similarity Serve as a Heuristic Cue for Kinship?, 26 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 158 (2004); Steven M. Platek et al., Reactions to Children's Faces: Resemblance Affects
Males More than Females, 23 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (2002).
97.
See infra notes 138-70 and accompanying text.

98.

See

eds., 1985).
99.
Id.
100. Id.
101.
Id.

ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION

109-44 (James W. Behnke &Jo Andrews

University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform[

[VOL. 41:1

directly and
treatment that increases their reproductive success
102
thereby his or her reproductive success indirectly.
A hypothetical may help to illustrate this point. An individual
has a twenty-two-year-old nephew who is having great difficulty in
securing employment. Although this individual ordinarily refuses
to use his professional connections to help young adults find ajob,
he makes a series of phone calls on behalf of his nephew. Even
though he does not know his nephew well, he vouches for his intelligence and desire to work hard. In doing this, he risks losing
credibility among those with whom he works and conducts business-a loss that may subsequently diminish his direct reproductive
success. But he also provides potentially substantial benefits to his
nephew that may subsequently enhance the nephew's reproductive
success. Because the uncle shares approximately twenty-five percent of his genetic material with his nephew,0 3 the uncle may
increase his own reproductive success by favoring and assisting his
nephew in this way. If the nephew is more successful in producing
children who possess some of the uncle's genetic material, the uncle will realize benefits in terms of his own reproductive success.
These potential benefits may outweigh the possible diminution of
the uncle's direct reproductive success.104
Research on both animal10° 5 and human 10 behavior has found a

tendency to favor kin. An essential component of this tendency is
an individual's capacity to recognize kin. Kinship cues serve this

102. Id. Justin H. Park et al., The Psychology of Human Kin Recognition: Heuristic
Mechanisms and Their Implications 22-25 (2006) (on file with author).
103.

See DAVIDJ. BULLER, ADAPTING MINDS 351-55 (2005).

104. See TRIVERS, supra note 98, at 113-14. Robert Trivers presents this concept in
mathematical form by asserting that an individual tends to provide benefits to another if the
indirect benefit to the donor's reproductive success (B) multiplied by the degrees of relatedness (r) (25% in the example in the text) is greater than the direct cost to the donor's
reproductive success (C)-Br > C. There is evidence that altruistic acts among kin are especially likely and pronounced in a life and death situation. In such a situation, the benefits of
acting to help kin are likely large in relation to the costs. See Eugene Burnstein, Christian

Crandall & Shinobu Kitayama, Some Neo-Darwinian Decision Rules for Altruism: Weighing Cues
for Inclusive Fitness as a Function of the Biological Importance of the Decision, 67 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 773 (1994).
105.

See DAvIDJ. C.

FLETCHER

& CHARLES D. MICHENER, KIN RECOGNITION IN ANIMALS

(1987); Burnstein, et al., supra note 104; Paul W. Sherman, Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm
Calls, 197 SCIENCE 1246 (1977).
106. See Burnstein et al., supra note 104, at 773-89; Martin Daly et al., Kinship: The Conceptual Hole in Psychological Studies of Social Cognition and Close Relationships, in EVOLUTIONARY
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 265 (Jeffrey A. Simpson & Douglas T. Kenrick eds., 1997); Daniel J.
Kruger, Evolution and Altruism: CombiningPsychological Mediators with Naturally Selected Tendencies, 24 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 118, 118-24 (2003); Park & Schaller, supra note 96, at
159-60.
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function, constituting cognitive heuristic mechanisms for the recognition of kin that often operate at an unconscious level.0 7
Behavioral biology researchers have identified several kinship
cues such as facial resemblance, 8 attitude similarity, 09 odor,"0 and
co-residence during early childhood."' These researchers have also
explored the operation of kinship cues and the inclination to provide beneficial treatment to kin. 112 For example, researchers
examining facial resemblance as a kinship cue conducted a series
of studies using arrays of photographs of children's faces that included a photograph constructed by morphing a child's face with
that of the adult subject." 3 The results of these studies indicate that
adult subjects
strongly favor a child who shares their facial fea4
tures.'

Some of these researchers have also found that this inclination
to provide favorable treatment to children based on facial resemblance is stronger in men than in women."" The researchers note
that men face a higher degree of uncertainty surrounding their
biological relationship to a particular child, and therefore an increased risk of misdirected parental investment. In light of this
paternity uncertainty, the researchers speculate that men rely more
heavily on facial resemblance to assure themselves that a particular
child is biologically related to them and to identify the child for
favorable treatment."' While the inclination to provide favorable
treatment to a child who resembles them is present in women, it is
stronger in men.l7

107. Park and Schaller, supra note 96, at 159-60, 166-67.
108. See Platek et al., supra note 96, at 159-60, 164-65; Lisa M. DeBruine, Resemblance to
Self Increases the Appeal of Child Faces to Both Men and Women, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV.
142, 143, 151 (2004).
109. See Park & Schaller, supra note 96, at 166-67.
110.

See Richard H. Porter &John D. Moore, Human Kin Recognition by Olfactory Cues, 27
493-95 (1981); Glenn E. Weisfeld et al., PossibleOlfaction-basedMechanisms in Human Kin Recognition and Inbreeding Avoidance, 85 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD

PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV.
PSYCHOL.

111.

279 (2003).
See Bevc & Silverman, supra note 96, at 151-52, 159-60.

112.
See, e.g., Park & Schaller, supra note 96; Platek et al., supra note 96.
113.
See DeBrtine, supra note 108; Platek et al., supra note 96; Steven M. Platek et al.,
Reactions to Children s Faces: Males Are More Affected by Resemblance than Females Are, and So Are
Their Brains, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 394 (2004).

114. DeBruine, supra note 108, at 150-01; Platek et al., supra note 96, 162-65; Platek et
al., supra note 113, at 397-98, 402-03.
115.

Platek et al., supra note 113, 397-98, 402-03; Platek supra 96, 162-65.

116. Platek et al., supra note 96, at 159-60,164-65; Platek et al., supra note 113, at 395.
117. Platek et al., supra note 96, at 162-65; Platek et al., supra note 113, at 397-98, 40203. But see DeBruine, supra note 108, at 151-52 (questioning the differences between men
and women in their reaction to children's facial resemblance).
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Research examining attitude similarity as a kinship cue provides
a second example." 8 The findings indicate that an individual tends
to favor others who share his or her attitudes.'" 9 In a recent study,
researchers initially determined the attitudes of subjects in relation
to ten items. They then introduced the subjects to two women
through photographs and descriptions of their attitudes on the
measured items. The women were comparable in terms of age and
physical features. However, one woman shared the attitudes of the
subject, while the other did not."' The researchers found that subjects favored the woman who shared their attitudes, exhibiting a
significantly stronger inclination to provide beneficial treatment to
this woman in comparison to the woman who did not share their
attitudes. In addition, through careful design of the study, the researchers determined that the positive feelings evoked by attitude
similarity did not arise from general feelings of pleasantness. Instead, the subjects' reactions to the profiles of12 the two women
1
arose independently from perceptions of kinship.
The researchers also determined that the subjects' favorable reaction to the similar attitude was largely unconscious. 122 The
subjects did not consciously assess the woman who shared their attitudes as genetically related to them. This result supports the idea
that attitude similarity is simply a component of an unconscious
kinship and
heuristic mechanism that gives rise to perceptions of
2 3
individual.
other
the
toward
feelings
favorable
evokes
Although researchers need to conduct further studies on the effects of various kinship cues, the research completed to date
118. See Park & Schaller, supranote 96.
119. Id.; see also Donn Byrne et al., The Ubiquitous Relationship: Attitude Similarity and Attraction: A Cross-CulturalStudy, 24 HUM. REL. 201 (1971) (finding that perceived attitude
similarity promotes interpersonal attraction across five distinct cultural groups); Fang Fang
Chen & Douglas T Kenrick, Repulsion or Attraction? Group Membership and Assumed Attitude
Similarity, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 11 (2002) (finding that perceived attitude
similarity increases attraction between individuals, especially if the individuals are not members of the same social or political group); Milton E. Rosenbaum, The Repulsion Hypothesis:
On the Nondevelopment of Relationships, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1156 (1986) (as-

serting that perceived attitude similarity does not necessarily lead to attraction, but that
perceived attitude dissimilarity leads to repulsion between individuals).
120. Park & Schaller, supranote 96, at 162-63.
121. Id. at 164-67.
122. Id.
123. Id. However, it must be noted that it is unclear how powerfully and for how long
shared attitudes evoke favorable feelings and possible favorable treatment. Id. at 167. See also
Jerry M. Burger et al., What a Coincidence! The Effects of Incidental Similarity on Compliance, 30
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 35 (2004) (raising the possibility that prosocial behav-

ior evoked by superficial similarities may constitute only a fleeting sense of attraction and
that additional research needs to be conducted in order to determine the limits of the effect).
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already has potential implications for foster care placement policy.
Foster care presents risks for children such as maltreatment and
low parental investment. 12 Thus, it may be desirable to secure
placements in which foster parents are likely to provide beneficial
treatment to the biologically unrelated children in their care.12 5 If
so, caseworkers would benefit from tools that allow them to match
a particular foster child with a foster parent who is more likely to
favor that child. Kinship cues may constitute one such tool.
For example, by placing a foster child with a foster parent who
has similar facial features, a caseworker may evoke unconscious
perceptions of kinship and secure favorable treatment for the foster child. 126 This strategy may be especially effective with foster
fathers because men are more influenced by facial resemblance.
Similarly, a caseworker may be able to prompt favorable treatment
for a foster child by matching some of the child's attitudes with
those of the foster parent.' 2 In summary, child welfare agencies
may be able to use knowledge of kinship cues in order to enhance
foster child safety and well-being.
One characteristic that may serve as a rough, partial proxy for
facial resemblance and attitude similarity is race. 2 9 Skin color or
tone may be a factor an individual considers in assessing facial similarities. Other facial features, such as hair texture or nose shape,
that correlate with race may also be relevant to an assessment of

124. See Mary I. Benedict et al., Types and Frequency of Child Maltreatment by Family Foster
CareProviders in an Urban Population, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 577 (1994); Anne Case et
al., EducationalAttainment of Siblings in Stepfamilies, 22 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (2001)
(research findings indicate low parental investment in foster children in comparison to
investment in biological children who reside in the same household);Jill Chaifetz, Listening
to FosterChildren in Accordance with the Law: The Failureto Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 7 (1999)

(noting high incidences of abuse and neglect within

foster care); Child Welfare League of America, NationalWorking Group to Improve Child Welfare
Data: Highlights: Child Maltreatment in Foster Care: Understanding the Data (2002)
http://ndas cwla'°rg/Include/text/NWG-CMinFC-FinalCopy.PDF (asserting that the incidence of maltreatment in care is relatively low, but that it is a significant problem that is
difficult to measure).
125. This article does not address kinship foster care placements.
126. Herring, FacialResemblance, supra note 2.
127. See Platek et al., supra note 96; Platek et al., supra note 113. But see DeBruine, supra
note 108 (presenting research findings that indicate that men and women are equally affected by perceptions of facial resemblance). This is important because most incidents of
child maltreatment in foster care are perpetrated by men. SeeJames A. Rosenthal et al., A
DescriptiveStudy ofAbuse and Neglect in Out-of-Home Placement, 15 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 249
(1991).
128. Herring, Attitude Similarity,supra note 2.
129. See id. at 388-90; Herring, FacialResemblance, supranote 2, at 408-09.
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similarity.13 0 In addition, some attitudes possessed by both children
and adults may correlate with race.
Of course, race does not invariably indicate facial resemblance
or attitude similarity, but on average, individuals who share racial
132
features may be more likely to perceive each other as similar.
Conversely, individuals of different races may be more likely to
perceive each other as dissimilar.133 The likelihood of these perceptions of similarity and dissimilarity allows one to posit that two
individuals of different races are less likely to perceive each other
as kin than are two individuals of the same race, and that two individuals of the same race are more likely to perceive each other as
kin than are two individuals of different races.
This reasoning provides a foundation for a hypothesis concerning race and foster care placements. Because foster parents
caring for a child of the same race may be more likely to perceive
the child as kin and to provide favorable care, children in non-kin,
same-race foster care placements are likely to be safer and health13 1

130. See Robert W. Livingston & Marilynn B. Brewer, What Are We Really Priming? CueBased Versus Category-Based Processingof Facial Stimuli, 82 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
5 (2002); Leslie A. Zebrowitz &Joann Montepare, The EcologicalApproach to Person Perception:
Evolutionary Roots and Contemporary Offshoots, in EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 97
(Mark Schaller et al. eds., 2006).
131. Within American society, the formation of attitudes that correlate with race may
occur relatively early in childhood. See generally Daphne Blunt Bugental, Acquisition of the
Algorithms of Social Life: A Domain-Based Approach, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187, 196-97, 209-10
(2000) (citing LAWRENCE A. HIRSCHFELD, RACE IN THE MAKING: COGNITION, CULTURE, AND
THE CHILD'S CONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN KINDS (1996)).
132. See generally Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 130; Livingston & Brewer, supra
note 130.
133. See generally Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 130.
134. In formulating this hypothesis, it is important to note that race may well not serve
as an independent kinship cue. The characteristics that allow for categorization by race
emerged relatively recently in the course of human evolution. See TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH
& WILLIAM E ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN NATURE 289-90 (2001). In
other words, it is unlikely that individuals possessed racial features in the environment that
existed for most of human evolution. Therefore, humans may well not have developed a
cognitive mechanism that relies on racial features in order to identify kin. In'addition, research indicates that racial features do not belie or signal significant genetic similarities or
differences among individuals. See id. Thus, even if differential racial features were present
in the evolutionary environment, these features would not relate to genetic material in a way
that would support the development of a kinship recognition mechanism.
Despite the likelihood that race does not serve as an independent kinship cue, race may
be related to particular kinship cues in a way that influences an individual's perception of
others as kin or non-kin. As noted in the text above, the observation of shared racial features
may contribute to a perception of facial resemblance and a corresponding perception of
kinship. In addition, without essentializing individuals by race, it may be the case that shared
racial features signal an increased likelihood of shared attitudes on particular matters. Thus,
the observation of shared racial features may contribute to a perception of attitude similarity
and a corresponding perception of kinship.
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ier than5 children in non-kin, different-race foster care place1
ments.

B. Social Psychology Research-In-GroupFavoritism
A second line of research provides stronger support for this hy-

pothesis. Social psychologists and behavioral biologists have begun
to examine the consequences of in-group favoritism arising from
superficial similarities.1 3 6 Their research indicates that individuals
perceive and treat more favorably, at least in the short-term, those
with whom they share an attribute. 3 7 The shared attribute need not
be high in heritability or relate in any consistent or strong way with
kinship; in this sense the attribute is considered superficial or arbitrary.' s Yet if the attribute is shared with another, and especially if it
is relatively rare or unique, it is likely to evoke favorable perceptions and behavior.13 9
Several experiments illustrate this behavioral tendency. Kerris
Oates and Margo Wilson conducted an experiment that initially
examined whether surnames operated as a kinship cue. ' 4° They
noted that a kinship cue "can be arbitrary provided that it is statistically associated with relatedness."' 4' They hypothesized that a
shared family surname may operate as a cue of kinship, stating that
"people may respond to nominal kinship cues as if they are kin

135. Kin placements are not included because they are presumably same-race placements and they usually involve an actual biological relationship. Based on behavioral biology
research, one could reasonably hypothesize that children will be safer in kinship placements
than in non-kin placements. Child welfare researchers have formulated this hypothesis and
have begun testing it. SeeJill Duerr Berrick, Assessing Quality of Care in Kinship and FosterFam-

ily Care, 46 FAMILY RELATIONS 273 (1997); Gary S. Cuddeback, Kinship Family Foster Care: A
Methodologicaland Substantive Synthesis of Research, 26 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REv. 623 (2004).
The results may support the increasing use and prevalence of kinship placements.
136. See Burger et al., supra note 123, at 35 (discussing studies finding that individuals
who believed they shared a birthday, a first name, or fingerprint characteristics with a requester were more likely to comply with a request than those who did not share such an

incidental characteristic); Kerris Oates & Margo Wilson, Nominal Kinship Cues FacilitateAltruism, 269 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOC'Y OF LONDON B 105 (2002) (discussing study finding that
individuals were most likely to respond helpfully when they believed that they shared a
name with a requester, and that this was especially true if they shared a relatively uncommon
name).
137. Burger et al., supra note 123, at 41-2; Oates & Wilson, supra note 136, at 105-09.
138. Burger et al., supranote 123, at 35-7; Oates& Wilson, supra note 136, at 105.
139. See Burger et al., supra note 123, at 36 (noting that previous work indicates that
"incidental similarities often create a sense of association between two people"); Oates &
Wilson, supra note 136, at 106-08.
140. Oates & Wilson, supra note 136.
141. Id. at 105.
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markers, and feel more inclined to help people
with the same sur"4
name than those with a different surname. 0 2
Oates and Wilson also examined personal names. ' They
thought it unlikely that a shared first name would operate as a kinship cue in the absence of a shared surname or another cue of
kinship.144 (If individuals share a surname, a shared personal name
could be an additional cue of kinship because an infant is often
named after another member of the family.) However, Oates and
Wilson expected shared personal names to evoke favorable treatment independent of surnames because "almost any arbitrary
marker shared in common is effective in facilitating5 favouritism
toward in-group members over out-group members.'

Oates and Wilson hypothesized that individuals would be more
likely to provide assistance to another who shares both their surname and personal name in comparison to another who shares
neither of their names.1 46 In addition, if shared names serve primarily as kinship cues, Oates and Wilson expected individuals to be
significandy more likely to provide assistance to another who
shares only their surname in comparison to another who shares
only their personal name. 47 However, if a shared name serves more
as an arbitrary marker that facilitates in-group favoritism, the experiment would not find a significant difference in behavior
between those who shared surnames and those who shared first
names. 48Finally, Oates and Wilson expected individuals who share
unique or relatively unusual names to be more likely to provide
assistance than those who share relatively common names because
unusual names would send a stronger4 9signal of kinship or constitute a more powerful in-group marker.

In order to test these hypotheses, Oates and Wilson sent e-mail
messages to 2961 valid North American addresses. The researchers
varied the name of the e-mail addressee and the e-mail sender so
that the addressees could receive a message from a sender who
shared both their surname and first name, only their surname,
only their first name, or neither name. The names used for both
senders and addressees fell within two categories-(1) names that

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id.
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are relatively prevalent in the U.S. name census, and (2) names
that are less prevalent in the name census, but that are not rare.150
Each addressee received a standard message that requested assistance. More specifically, the sender's message asked the addressee
to identify his or her city's sports team mascot(s) and its date of
inception. The researchers considered a reply to this message
within two weeks a minor act of altruism. If the addressee failed to
respond within that period, the researchers
considered this a lack
51
of assistance and an absence of altruism.
Based on the results of the experiment, the researchers found
that sharing less prevalent names elicited a higher number of responses than sharing more common names. 15 2 In addition, when
both names were identical there were significantly more e-mail replies than when neither name was the same and when only one was
the same.5 3 Overall, there was no difference in response rate when
the addressee and the sender shared only a surname and when
they shared only a first name. 5 4 However, if the researchers considered only less prevalent names (for which a shared surname was
more likely to be perceived as indicating kinship), the response
rate for a shared surname was significantly higher than for a shared
first name.'15 Nonetheless, a shared first name elicited more responses than no shared names.156 Finally, the researchers noted
that women's response rate was significantly higher than that of
men, especially when the sender and the addressee shared less
prevalent names. For women, the response rate was 26.6% when
they shared both names, 12.5% when they shared a last name,
8.4% when they shared a first name, and 3.3% when they did not
share a name. For men, the response rate was 8.3% when they
shared both names, 6.3% when they shared a surname, 2.6% when
they shared a first name, and 1.5% when they did not share a
157
name.
The results indicate that shared names evoke favorable treatment, with the strongest reaction to shared surnames. This latter
finding indicates that shared surnames give rise to perceptions of
kinship. 158However, shared first names also evoke favorable
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 106-07.
153. Id.at 106.
154. Id.at 107.
155. Id.
156. Id.at 107-08.
157. Id.at 107. The researchers speculated that women in North American societies are
more attuned to kinship markers than men in these societies. Id.at 108.
158. Id.
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treatment. This result indicates either an inclination to view another individual as kin based on similarities that do not logically
signal genetic relatedness, or that sharing any superficial attribute
with another will give rise to in-group favoritism.159 The first possibility indicates a strong tendency to view non-kin as kin-in other
words to make a false-positive error. 60 The second possibility indicates a tendency to favor others who share some superficial
16
attribute whether or not it gives rise to perceptions of kinship.
The attribute of race may operate consistent with this second
possibility. That is, even if race does not give rise to perceptions of
kinship, it may evoke favorable treatment among those who share a
particular racial category.62 This may be especially true for individuals who are members of a minority race within their
community. In this context, race may be analogous to sharing a
less prevalent first name.
Researchers have conducted additional experiments on superficial similarities that may support the hypothesis concerning race
and in-group favoritism. For example, a team of researchers conducted a set of experiments in which some subjects believed they
shared a birthday, a first name, or unusual fingerprint characteristics with another person. 64 In each experiment, the researchers
asked subjects to provide assistance to another person. The results
of each experiment supported the hypothesis that sharing a superficial characteristic with someone who requests assistance evokes
favorable treatment. In the experiment using birthdays, 62.2% of
the subjects who shared a birthday with the person who asked for
assistance agreed to help her with a paper assignment while only
34.2% of subjects who did not share a birthday with the requester
agreed to provide asitnc.I
assistance.

5In

the
experiment using first
names,
heeprietuin
istnms

a participant asked each subject to donate money to the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation. The subjects who shared a first name with the
participant gave an average donation of $2.07, whereas the subjects
who did not share a first name with the participant gave an average
159.
160.

Id. at 105.
Behavioral biology researchers have provided theoretical support for such a ten-

dency in relation to heuristic kinship cues developed under certain evolutionary conditions.
See Park et al., supra note 102, at 159; Hudson Kern Reeve, The Evolution of Conspecific Acceptance Thresholds, 133 Am. NATURALIST 407 (1989).
161. See Oates& Wilson, supra note 136, at 105-06.
162. See Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 130, at 96-97.

163.

See Burger et al., supra note 123, at 40 (indicating that an attribute shared with an-

other is more likely to evoke prosocial behavior if it is less prevalent within the relevant

population); Oates & Wilson, supra note 136.
164.

Burger et al., supranote 123, at 41.

165.

Id. at 38.
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donation of $1.00."6 In the experiment using fingerprint characteristics, a researcher told one group of subjects that they shared an
uncommon fingerprint type with another person, a second group
of subjects that they shared a common fingerprint type with another person, and a third group of subjects nothing about their
fingerprints. The researchers then asked each subject to provide
assistance to the other person on a paper assignment. The findings
revealed that 82.1% of the subjects who shared uncommon fingerprints agreed to provide assistance, 54.8% of the subjects who
shared common fingerprints agreed, and 48.3%
of the subjects
17
assist.
to
agreed
fingerprints
about
told nothing
It is possible that race may constitute a superficial characteristic
akin to birth date, first name, or fingerprints. 6 If so, sharing race
with another person may evoke favorable treatment, especially if
one shares membership in a minority race.

C. The Formationof a Hypothesis
As shown in the discussions in Parts III.A and III.B, behavioral
biology and social psychology research provide a basis for a hypothesis concerning race and foster care placements. Race may
contribute to perceptions of kinship that arise from cues such as
facial resemblance or attitude similarity. 69 In addition, race may be
70
a superficial attribute that gives rise to in-group favoritism.
Therefore, one may reasonably expect non-kin foster parents to be
more likely to perceive foster children of the same race either as
kin or as members of an in-group whom they are inclined to favor.
Further, one may reasonably expect that, on average, foster parents
would treat foster children of the same race more favorably than
foster children of a different race. This favorable treatment would
likely result in better outcomes for same-race foster children in
terms of child safety (e.g., lower rate of maltreatment) and wellbeing (e.g., healthier attachments and family bonds, fewer mental
health problems, better educational performance, less delinquency) .71

166. Id. at 39.
167. Id. at 40.
168. See Zebrowitz & Montepare, supra note 130, at 96-97.
169. See supranotes 96-135 and accompanying text.
170. See supranotes 136-168 and accompanying text.
171. For a general discussion of safety and well-being measures that researchers consider relevant to an assessment of the quality of care provided in foster care placements, see
Cuddeback, supra note 135, at 627-32.
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Similarly, the research suggests that foster parents are less likely
to perceive different-race foster children as kin or as members of
an in-group. Such parents may be inclined to provide their foster
children with less favorable treatment. Such an inclination may
result in worse outcomes for different-race foster children.
1. A Related Hypothesis-Stepparent Care
Consider a somewhat similar hypothesis concerning stepparent
care formulated by Martin Daly and Margo Wilson. 72 Daly and Wilson based their hypothesis on evolutionary theory and behavioral
biology research.17 Because stepparents are not genetically related
to their stepchildren, one would expect stepparents, overall, to
make a relatively low investment in stepchildren. 7 4 By conferring
benefits on a stepchild, a stepparent would only incur a cost in
terms of the stepparent's own reproductive success. The stepparent
may receive a reproductive benefit related to this cost if his or her
effort increased the likelihood of mating success with the stepchild's biological parent, but Daly and Wilson reasoned that this
indirect mating strategy benefit would be significantly less than the7
direct reproductive benefit provided by biological children. 1 5
Thus, in comparison to a biological parent's treatment of his or
her child, a stepparent would be less inclined to provide favorable
treatment to a stepchild.
Daly and Wilson tested their hypothesis by examining the most
severe cases of parental failure-those involving child death as a
result of parental maltreatment. 7 6 An examination of the data collected in cases of child death supported their hypothesis. The rate
of child death at the hands of a stepparent is much higher than the
rate of child death at the hands of a biological parent. 17 7 The researchers concluded that children who live with a stepparent or
another unrelated adult are much more likely to experience seri172. MARTIN DALY & MARCO WILSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT CINDERELLA (1998).
173. Id.; Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, DiscriminativeParentalSolicitude: A Biological Perspective, 42J. MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 277 (1980).
174. Daly & Wilson, supranote 173, at 178; see also DALY & WILSON, supra note 172.
175. DALY & WILSON, supranote 172, at 62-6; Sievert Rowher et al., StepparentalBehavior
as Mating Effort in Birds and OtherAnimals, 20 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 367 (1999).
176. MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 83-93 (1988); Martin Daly & Margo
Wilson, An Assessment of Some ProposedExceptions to the Phenomenon of Nepotistic Discrimination
Against Stepchildren, 38 ANNALES ZOOLOGIcI FENNICI 287, 291 (2001) [hereinafter Nepotistic
Discrimination].
177. DALY & WILSON, HOMICIDE, supra note 176, at 83-93; Daly & Wilson, NepotisticDiscrimination, supranote 176, at 290-92.
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ous maltreatment than children living exclusively with one or both
of their biological parents.""
Although this finding was not a complete surprise, it cut against
a popular, hopeful view concerning the parity of stepparents and
biological parents. This view arose from an effort to remove the
stigma surrounding stepfamilies.179 Following Daly and Wilson's
work, policy-makers may still want to take steps to reduce this
stigma, but they may be able to more fully consider the risks posed
to stepchildren. In addition, Daly and Wilson's research, if considered seriously, would likely impact child protection policies,
possibly leading to adjustments in risk assessment protocols applicable to child maltreatment investigations and in the level of
support services provided to stepfamilies.1 0 Such adjustments may
result in improvements to stepchild safety and well-being.
2. A Test of the Formulated Hypothesis-Implications for
Law and Policy
Although stepfamilies differ from foster families in important
ways,18 ' both situations raise reasonable concerns about parental
investment by adults who are not biologically related to the children in their care. 182 These concerns call for the testing of
hypotheses regarding foster care conditions and outcomes. The
178.

DALY & WILSON, Ho1mICIDE, supra note 176, at 83-93; Daly & Wilson, NepotisticDis-

crimination, supra note 176; see also Patricia G. Schnitzer & Bernard G. Ewigman, Child Deaths
Resulting From Inflicted Injuries: Household Risk Factors and PerpetratorCharacteristics,116 PEDIATRICS 687 (2005).
179. SeeJones, supra note 2, at 1238.
180. See id. at 1234-36.
181. Foster parents make a conscious and primary decision to invest in caring for a
child. They are not engaged in a mating strategy similar to that of stepparents. Related to
this point, it is important to note that foster parents' decision to provide care for a child may
not be as strong as that of adoptive parents, whom Daly and Wilson expressly recognize as
presenting a different situation than stepparents. Daly & Wilson, supra note 173, at 282-83.
The data on child deaths reveal that children living with adoptive parents are not maltreated
at a higher rate than children living with biological parents. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig &
Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter? Adoptions By Kin Caregivers, 36 FAM. L.Q.
449, 462-63 (2002). Parents who adopt a child are making a long-term commitment to a
particular child that calls for a conscious decision to heavily invest in the adopted child. In
contrast, adults who decide to provide foster care make a commitment to care for a child for
a limited period that will likely not extend throughout childhood. They contract to provide
temporary care and to receive financial compensation from the state. Although the compensation is usually meager, it is often part of the foster parent's calculation in agreeing to
provide short-term care for what likely will be a series of children living in their home. In
summary, the foster care situation may be somewhat less problematic than the stepparent
situation in terms of the level of parental investment, but somewhat more problematic than
the adoptive or biological parent situation.
182. See generally Daly & Wilson, supra note 173; Schnitzer & Ewigman, supranote 178.
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results of such research may have significant implications for foster
care placement policies and practices, just as Daly and Wilson's
studies concerning stepfamilies 3have implications for public policies related to child protection.

. Testing the specific hypothesis formulated in this Article would
entail a comparison of child outcomes for non-kin, same-race foster care placements with those for non-kin, different-race foster
care placements. If the hypothesis holds true, one would expect a
lower rate of maltreatment for foster children in same-race placements than that for foster children in different-race placements.
One would also expect children in same-race placements to perform better than children in different-race placements on
measures of child well-being such as attachment, mental health,
attainment, delinquent behavior, and social relationeducational
8 4
ships.1
The new knowledge produced by such a comparative study
would likely affect assessments of particular laws and policies. On
one hand, researchers may prove the hypothesis false with findings
that indicate insignificant differences between same-race foster
care placements and different-race placements. This would mean
that the MEPA prohibition on the systematic consideration of race
in making foster care placement decisions is not problematic in
terms of child safety and well-being. In terms of the debate surrounding MEPA, participants could reasonably view foster care
placement decisions as similar to adoption placement decisions. In
both settings, transracial placements would not appear to present a
significant risk of harm to affected children.15 The debate could
then appropriately focus on MEPA's impact on the racial identity

183. SeeJones, supranote 2, at 1234-38.
184. In considering this specific research project, one should note that researchers have
already begun examining another hypothesis about foster care--children placed in kinship
placements are likely to have better outcomes than children in non-kin foster care placements. See Berrick, supra note 135; Brinig & Nock, supra note 181; Cuddeback, supra note
135. The initial research efforts in this area indicate that researchers have the capacity to
design and implement comparative studies of foster care conditions and outcomes. It may
be difficult to gather the detailed data necessary for exhaustive comparative analyses, but
this type of research appears feasible. In fact, the public child welfare system appears to
provide a natural setting for applied research on theories and hypotheses related to kinship,
kinships cues, and superficial similarities. Researchers should take advantage of this setting
in order to test hypotheses outside the laboratory and to include legal scholars on the research team. See David J. Herring, Legal Scholarship, Humility, and the Scientific Method, 25
QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 867 (2007).
185. See Bradley & Hawkins-Le6n, supra note 42, at 433-36; Brooks & Barth, supra note
42, at 94-98; Courtney, supranote 88.
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and coping skills of minority children and on the composition and
health of minority communities."6
On the other hand, research may confirm the hypothesis. This
would mean that MEPA's prohibition is problematic in terms of
child safety and well-being in foster care. In barring the consideration of race, MEPA would expose children to a heightened risk of
maltreatment in foster care and worse developmental outcomes.
Such findings would also support the alleged covert agency practice of matching the race of the foster child with that of the foster
parent even if it means a delay in achieving a relatively stable foster
care placement. 7 By engaging in such a practice, child welfare
workers may be ensuring the safety and well-being of many minority children.
At the least, research that confirms the hypothesis would provide
new knowledge relevant to the debate over MEPA and transracial
placements. It would likely give rise to a new debate-one focused
on foster care placement decisions. Further, this new debate could
reveal a tension between MEPA and the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act ("ASFA"). lss ASFA expressly states that its paramount
concern is child safety and health. 8 9 By prohibiting the systematic

consideration of race in making foster care placement decisions,
MEPA may increase the risk of harm faced by children in foster
care. Thus, the MEPA approach may stand in tension with the
paramount goal of ASFA. This conflict would expose a difficult and
controversial question-does the pursuit of a colorblind foster care
placement regime justify placing some children at an increased
risk of maltreatment or other negative outcomes? If research supports the hypothesis formulated in this Article, this difficult
question is worthy of consideration and public discussion.
Furthermore, federal officials would likely have to reconsider
their constitutional analysis.' 90 If the systematic consideration of
race in foster care placement decisions significantly enhances child
safety and well-being, state actors may have a compelling interest in
such an approach.' 9' In that case, the consideration of race along
186. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
187. For discussion of the longstanding practice of race matching and possible resistance to MEPA, see Brooks & Barth, supra note 42, at 87; Brooks et al., supranote 40, at 57677; HHS Guide, supra note 38.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (15) (A) (2007); Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No.
105-89, § 101, 111 Stat. 2115, 2116 (1997).
189. Id.
190. See HHS Guide, supra note 38, at 4-5.
191. See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (stating that a state has a
duty of the highest order to secure children's interests and that the best interests of the
child constitute a substantial government interest for purposes of the Equal Protection
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with numerous other factors that relate to a foster child's best interests may constitute a narrowly tailored means for securing the
state's compelling interest. 92 This latter conclusion would be especially appropriate in regard to placement decisions that must be
made near the time of a child's removal from parental custody or
from a foster home. Although an initial emergency placement may
truly be temporary in nature (e.g., a group shelter facility), the
agency in most cases must find a relatively stable foster care placement in a timely manner. 93 Therefore, any delay in placement is
likely to be limited (i.e., less than ninety days) even if state actors
attempt to secure a same-race placement.' 4
It should be noted that this time pressure in making a foster
care placement decision is different than that typically confronted
in making an adoption placement decision. In the adoption situation, a long delay is much more feasible, and thus, likely. For
example, no pressing need would dictate removal of a child from a
stable, transracial foster placement. Therefore, an agency could
take its time in seeking a same-race adoptive home, letting the
child remain in foster care and forgoing an adoptive placement
with different-race parents. The resulting extended delay in achievcould expose the affected child to a
ing an adoption placement
15
9
harm.
of
risk
significant
Clause, but that the state cannot accommodate and reinforce racist attitudes in pursuing
this interest); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding
state's interest in the operation of a research-oriented elementary school dedicated to improving the quality of education in urban public schools is compelling, allowing the
consideration of race as one of many factors in making admissions decisions); Drummond %.
Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding sufficient government interest in securing the best interests of a child to allow the
consideration of race as one of many factors in making an adoption placement decision);
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 E. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that the goal of making an adequate long-term foster care placement that provides for a foster child's racial and
cultural needs and that is consistent with the best interests of the child is indisputably a
compelling governmental interest for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause).
192. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1061;
Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205; Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. at 1086 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (finding that if racial considerations are not the sole reason for placement decisions, but only
one of several factors, they do not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause); Compos v.
McKeithen, 341 F. Stipp. at 266 (E.D. La. 1972) (finding the difficulties inherent in interracial adoption as justifying the consideration of race as a relevant factor in adoption, but not
asjustifying the use of race as a determinative factor).
193. SeeJames et al., supra note 33, at 192-96 (articulating and verifying the child welfare system intent to achieve an initial stable placement within forty-five days).
194. This is true even within a system that regularly places children in a central shelter,
then moves them to an emergency care unit, and then moves them to the intended initial
placement site. See James et al., supra note 33; Sigrid James, Mhy Do Foster Care Placements
Disrupt? An Investigation of Reasons for Placement Change in Foster Care, 78 Soc. SERVICE REV.
601 (2004).
195. See HHS Guide, supra note 38; Barth, supranote 40.
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Because of this difference, the constitutional analysis would not
be the same for both placement situations. Noting the higher risk
of harm to the child stemming from race matching in adoption, a
court should be less likely to view race matching as a narrowly tailored approach to securing a child's best interests."' 6 In fact, as the
delay lengthens and opportunities for timely transracial adoption
present themselves, the state may no longer have a strong, let alone
compelling, interest in placing the child with a same-race adoptive
family.97 At this point, the best interests of the child would likely
support a timely transracial adoption placement rather than an
extended or permanent wait for a same-race adoption placement.""'

As to the foster care placement process that occurs shortly after
a child's removal from parental custody, the more appropriate constitutional analogy is provided by the practice of affirmative action
in higher education."'9 The United States Supreme Court has ac-

knowledged a state's compelling interest in securing a diverse
student body. 0 Similarly, a state is likely to have a compelling interest in securing child safety and well-being in foster care. 20' The
Court has also found that the consideration of race as one factor
among many in making college admissions decisions is a narrowly
tailored means for achieving the state's compelling interest. 202 One
can certainly argue that the consideration of race as one of many
factors in making an initial foster care placement decision is a simimeans for achieving the state's particular compelling
larly tailored
20 3
interest.
In summary, if careful, rigorous research confirms the hypothesis that non-kin, same-race foster care placements are safer and
healthier than non-kin, different race placements, the MEPA prohibition on the consideration of race in making early foster care
placement decisions would be called into question. MEPA would
conflict with the paramount goal of federal child welfare
196.

See HHS Guide, supra note 38; Davidson M. Pattiz, Racial Preference in Adoption: An

Equal Protection Challenge,82 GEO L.J. 2571, 2597-98 (1994).
197. See Pattiz, supra note 196.
198. See id.
199. SeeGritter v. Bollinger, 593 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
200. Id.
201. The state's interest in child safety and well-being is arguably as important as its interest in educational diversity. See generally Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984);
Dnirmmond v. Fulton Coumnty Dep't of Family and Children's Serv., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th
Cir. 1977); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
202.
Grntter,539 U.S. at 334.
203.
See generally Drummond, 563 F.2d 1200; Tallman v Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Mich. 1994); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972).
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law-securing child safety and health. °4 In addition, such research
findings would likely support the constitutionality of a public
agency's systematic consideration of race in making early foster
care placement decisions. In the end, this research would encourage serious discussion and consideration of laws, policies, and
practices that allow or prohibit race matching in foster care.

CONCLUSION

Based on behavioral biology and social psychology research addressing kinship cues and superficial similarities that give rise to ingroup favoritism, one can hypothesize that non-kin, same-race foster care placements are safer and healthier for children than nonkin, different-race placements. Because such a hypothesis may have
significant implications for laws, policies, and practices related to
foster care placement decisions, it is worthy of serious investigation. At its core, this investigation should entail a careful collection
of data on maltreatment in foster care and other measures of foster
child well-being. Such data would allow researchers to engage in a
detailed analysis comparing non-kin, same-race foster care placements with non-kin, different-race placements.
Ideally, an interdisciplinary research team would pursue this inquiry.0 6 This team would include a behavioral biologist, a social
psychologist, a social work scholar, and a legal scholar. Together
they could design and carry out a research project to test the hypothesis formulated in this Article, effectively extending laboratory
research on kinship cues and in-group favoritism to field research
conducted through a socially important natural experimentfoster care. The legal scholar could communicate the research results to legal decision-makers and policy-makers, hopefully
spurring a serious public discussion of the consideration of race in
making foster care placement decisions. Such a discussion could
provide significant benefits to many children who enter foster care,
especially the substantial number who end up spending a substantial portion of their childhood in a foster home.

204.
205.
206.

Seesupra text accompanying notes 188, 189.
See supra text accompanying notes 190-203.
See Herring, supra note 184.

